Sociologist and legal theorist Max Weber argued that states claimed a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The monopoly is most successful, of course, when the overt use of state violence is minimised, acting as a sword of Damocles affecting the behaviour of everyone over which it hangs. Robert Cover sought to bring into view the violence implicit in the routine deployment of law -not merely in the use of police forces to arrest people for what all concede to be arguable violations of existing and uncontroversial law, but in the normative claims that ordinary and constitutional law make, which induce people to believe that whatever contrary views they might hold are somehow illegitimate.
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Introduction
This book is the result of an extended process of thinking that began with the draft of my paper 'Playing at being Gods'. 1 After this work I started to focus my interest on the main issues addressed in this book: constitutional legitimacy and the relationship between democracy and constitutions. The topics analysed in this book emerged progressively as a consequence of thinking about the preceding issues. The first question to be developed, constituting the opening premise, was that of the origins and influences of the religious discourse in the configuration of the modern constitutional system. Particularly important were the sacred conception of the US Constitution and the expansion of this phenomenon to the rest of the world's modern constitutions.
The drafters of the US Constitution consciously played the role of a civil God; the US Supreme Court developed the role of secular prophets; the Constitution was the sacred tablets; and the people of the United States became the chosen people. As the law was received by Moses on the tablets, so too did the Constitution adopt a legal, moral and religious character. This sort of metaphysical phenomenon and full authority was sought deliberately by the Founding Fathers and the drafters of the US Constitution, to obtain the kind of sovereignty and power that they needed. 2 The new fundamental norm of the state came outfitted with a sort of undisputed legitimacy, an almost divine authority.
The first issue analysed in this book considers the fundamentally religious character of the secular constitutions that eventually became what we understand as the modern American Constitution, and the undemocratic nature of constitutions in general. The founding of this constitutional doctrine, supported by this type of sacred speech, was not fortuitous. This consecrated supra-legitimacy sought, and still seeks, somehow to coerce the freedom of the people, requesting compliance instead of citizen participation. The first section of Chapter 2 deals with this new sort of theology and the influences of the religious discourse on the modern constitutional discourse, and also how jus-positivism contributed to the consolidation of this sacred-civil language. Various manifestations and theological concepts (that is, Messianism, eschatology and idolatry) have been applied to achieve undisputed legitimacy. Political and legal theologies are also analysed in Chapter 5, when constitutional violence proceeds against human rights. The conflict between human rights and constitutional dispositions unmasks the mundane reality of constitutions and constitutionalism.
The first premise (the application of the religious discourse by the new sovereign) raises the topic developed in the following section, 'Sovereignty and Subject', which consists of a synthesis of the concept of sovereignty and its relationship with modern constitutionalism. The starting point of the section is a definition of sovereignty, with particular attention to its multidisciplinary nature, types of sovereignty, the complexity of this notion and its current significance. To develop a comprehensive theory of the concept of sovereignty, I analyse classic and modern theories, different realities and fields of study, but always keeping contact with the main framework of this book, constitutional violence.
The main goal of this section is to provide a comprehensive notion of sovereignty, highlighting some of the fundamental characteristics of this notion that appear in the work of Hobbes, Kelsen, Schmitt and Derrida, for example. The selection of authors and features is based on the relationship between the role developed by the sovereign and violence. Once the definitions and features are set forth, the role of sovereignty and its relationship with violence is discussed by way of a conclusion. Then, by introducing a definition of sovereignty and the concept's need for genuine democratic legitimacy, I deduce why we can state that a given sovereignty is so and where its legitimacy comes from.
Chapter 2 goes on to analyse the Athenian experience of the fifth century BC, in which there was a change from popular sovereignty to the sovereignty of law. I attempt to obtain compelling premises and conclusions applicable to contemporary notions of sovereignty. The main conclusions drawn are that: (a) there is a real possibility of the sovereign switching from aristocracy to democracy, from the constitution to the people, and vice versa; (b) this alteration occurred gradually over time and not necessarily traumatically; (c) popular sovereignty functioned fully in Athens; and (d) the Athenian experience can be studied as an example of democratic establishment and in order to learn about the events that led to regression through the sovereignty of law.
The next topic studied, 'constitutional sovereignty', is also a conse quence of the preceding section. This issue begins with a jus-positive study of constitutional texts. Who or what is legitimated as a sovereign in a constitutional text? Who or what bestows this attribution? Having described, in the first section of this chapter, the origins and influences of religious discourse on the configuration of the modern constitutional system, and how this fact predetermined the expansion of this phenomenon to the rest of the world's modern constitutions, I go on to point out that real sovereign is not actually defined in the constitution but is the constitution itself.
This third section locates the real sovereign, highlighting the difference between the de jure sovereign and the de facto sovereign. It explores the difference between the constitutional text and its real enforcement in relation to the factual possessor of the sovereignty. The section ends with some reflections about the catharsis that affects the citizenry and what provokes the illusion. Chapter 2 performs a critical introductory function by establishing an analytic baseline, a fundamental premise of the book's argument: that current constitutional legitimacy is ultimately based on violence.
Chapter 3, is entitled 'Democracy', where, after clarifying who the real sovereign is in our modern constitutional states, it is necessary to analyse the relationship between the demos and the politeia. As Derrida says: 'there is a sort of "semantic indeterminacy" at the core of democracy', and because of this indeterminacy the relationship between democracy and sovereignty remains problematic.
3 Chapter 3 asks whether this disjunction might have its roots in the vagueness of the concept of democracy. Democracy is a concept that has had various meanings throughout history. Even knowing this difficulty, it is essential to redefine the meaning of democracy because of its relationship with the main object of this book. If democracy is the only way to give legitimacy to constitutionalism, we need to know what democracy means. The chapter starts by dealing with an etymological and historical definition of democracy, trying to concrete the semantic indeterminacy (Derrida) that affects the notion.
The second section of Chapter 3 deals with an important issue related to the foundation of popular sovereignty: who are 'the people'? And who determines who the people are? Then, I address the matter of who the optimum are. These questions will be answered for each legal system from a positive-law perspective, but this issue affects many other disciplines of thought, giving rise to a wide variety of answers depending on each discipline's particular casuistry. The section also faces two more questions related to the US Constitution and, therefore, to other constitutional documents. Once the people and the optimum are defined, I deal with the legitimisation of the role of the judiciary, which has been the subject of ongoing analysis by Anglo-American jurisprudents. I develop this section analysing the work of Michelman, Ackerman and Tushnet, but also Raztrying to define the role of the judiciary from different perspectives.
Then, Chapter 3 addresses a central question: the considerable tensions between constitutionalism and democracy. This section focuses on different methods for enhancing constitutional legitimacy: contractualism (or contract-based legitimacy); consensualism (acceptance-oriented legitimacy); procedural-dialogical legitimacy; constitutional authorship; and, finally, the rule of recognition. In the exposition of these theoretical categories I direct my attention to the way legitimacy is attributed and the role of the demos. In this chapter my point is to analyse the lack of democratic legitimacy in the 'founding moment', the approval of the basic norm using Kelsen's terminology, the first constitution. I contend that the undemocratic and violent founding (US independence and eighteenth-century France) has consequences for the development of the potentialities of democratic legi timacy in modern constitutional systems. Once the constitution is approved without real democratic legitimacy, I wonder where the undemocratic constitutional legitimacy comes from.
Chapter 4 is related to the link between violence and constitutional legitimacy. This chapter is a legal theoretical analysis of violent interactions in legal systems and specifically in constitutions. The main conclusion of this chapter is that without democratic legitimacy the only factor that ensures compliance with a constitutional system and constitutional enforcement is violence.
A definition of legal violence, its characteristics and categories, is given in the first section of the chapter. I illustrate the concept and effects of legal violence, analysing and complementing the works of Walter Benjamin, Derrida, Foucault, Cover and Sarat, but always restricting this definition to the constitutional sphere. The section includes a definition of coercion and the threat of violence, and how the constitutional system exploits these elements.
In Chapter 4, I expound various notions, the starting point being the relationship between law's legitimacy and its dependence on violence. Why do people obey the law? To answer this question I analyse different theories (habit of obedience, risk of punishment, and the role of legitimacy and authority). The next section of Chapter 4 deals with a definition of legal violence that is suitable to apply to the main objective of this book, namely, to define constitutional violence. The description of this relationship begins with a historical analysis, from Hebrew law to the role that violence played in the understanding and conceptualisation of law in Athens and Rome. I stress the importance of concepts such as vis, unlawfulness, self-help and vindicatio in our understanding of law, conditioned by the concept of violence. Then, we focus our attention on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the birth of modern constitutionalism, conditioned by bloody revolutions and violence. The main point of this section is to emphasise the violent origins of law and how violence has always been closely related to law. Chapter 4 goes on to supplement this historical account with a contemporary critique of law's violence. Then the chapter considers how legal violence is used by constitutions and constitutionalism, why a constitution without legitimacy involves violent implementation, and how this violent implementation is viewed as 'legitimate' by the enforcers. Violence affects law in different manners, in different spheres, internally as a feature of law, and externally through codification or the determination, interpretation and enforcement of legal meaning. This chapter analyses these different conno tations. The key point of this structure is to highlight the need to differentiate violence depending on how this phenomenon acts and affects law.
Some may argue that in the end violence is simply violence, but this differentiation will be helpful to analyse how violence interacts in the nomos of constitutionalism. The last paragraph is a sort of conclusion summarising the ideas that appear in the section; the final argument being that violence is ultimately the factor that 'legitimises' law. The main issue of this book is constitutional violence, which is a subtype of legal violence.
Chapter 5 is an exercise in comparative constitutional violence. It is a switch from the world of theory to the world of praxis. It begins with US constitutional violence, based on the application of the death penalty in Puerto Rico against the requirements of the Puerto Rican Constitution, the will of the people of Puerto Rico, the position of the Puerto Rican public institutions (governor, senate and municipalities) and, finally, against human rights and international conventions.
The next case analysed is French constitutional violence, which is set forth in two interrelated cases. The first deals with the constitutional accommodation of the debate between 'national sovereignty' and 'popular sovereignty', and its consequences in the whole French legal system. The case reveals how French constitutional violence produces violent homogenisation through constitutional legitimacy. The second example is strict case law, and reveals how the state apparatus has interpreted and enforced national identity in everyday aspects. The next examples in the book, Turkey and Chile, are clearly affected by the French understanding of constitu tio nalism and ethno-nationalism.
The example of Turkish constitutional violence is based on the military tutelage of political institutions, constitutions and a sort of pseudodemocracy of the state. The next case is Chilean constitutional violence. The analysis of this case is based primarily on the role that Chilean constitutionalism has developed in relation to the indigenous peoples. The Constitution as a founding act replaced the sovereign, created a new state, a new people and forced the assimilation of the different minorities into the new nation. The only alternative to assimilation was extermination. The role of constitutionalism was at least the juridification of this new political order. In other words, constitutionalism in Chile gave legal coverage to genocide. The last example is Spanish constitutional violence as a new way of determining democracy. After a period of transition from a military fascist dictatorship to democracy, the Constitution appeared to juridify the new Spanish democracy and 'transition'. As we will see, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 has some 'shadows' and 'reminiscences' of a military, undemocratic past.
After the American constitutional experience, constitutionalism and a religious conception of modern constitutions has almost completely triumphed. Almost every state in the world has a written constitution. The great majority of these declare the constitution to be the law controlling the organs of the state. We tend to label our liberal political systems as 'constitutional democracies', dividing the system into two different domains: a domain of politics, where the people rule; and a domain of law, which is set aside for a trained elite.
The relationship between these two domains has evolved since 1776, and we have tried to express the existence of an entente cordiale, a status in which the two 'sovereigns' do not interfere in the other's field. The American system, designed by The Federalist Papers, Democracy in America and the founding documents, has been consolidated over time by an elite of judges and lawyers.
Doctrinal texts have repeatedly shown that constitutionalism is the best guarantee for safeguarding fundamental rights. In this respect, Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen is an excellent example. However, the two-headed system (constitution and people) is a fiction that remains in effect because of undemocratic factors that ultimately depend on various types of violence. The people has never been the true sovereign in our system. 'Constitutional democracy' is simply a euphemism, since there is only one sovereign, and there is no 'we the people'. The main conclusion of this work is to confirm that Hobbes' famous statement, Autoritas, non veritas facit legem, stills stands in force; and that violence is the only way to achieve legitimacy in constitutional law.
Since the work of Robert Cover in the late twentieth century, the violence of the law has not been a common topic in American legal juris prudence. Cover's theorisation was a reflection on the contemporary situation of the law and the work of thinkers such as Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas. This book is a continuation of the work of these and other authors -but referring strictly to the constitutional domain.
Constitutional Violence is a multidisciplinary work of legal scholarship that examines the legitimacy of constitutional violence. The book analyses sovereignty, democracy and constitutionalism, and concludes that consti tutions are legitimised by legal force and violence. The book seeks to challenge constitutional legitimacy, submitting the concept to a type of elegkhein, and discussing this process with theoretical and practical examples.
Legal, political and constitutional practices demonstrate that constitutionalism and democracy seems to be irreconcilable. This book tries to mediate constructively in the dichotomy that Hamilton considered in 1776, namely, that good government is feasible and the constitutional system can be the best device to rule the country, but to achieve this objective it is necessary to reconcile 'we the people' and the constitution. The first step in this reconciliation is to recognise that constitutional democracy as such is impossible and that constitutional legitimacy is based on violence. This book concludes that human rights and democracy are the only solutions for deactivating the violence of a state when applied and legitimised through a constitution.
Portions This project and parts of the book were presented and discussed in a book presentation at the State University of New York (SUNY) and in the workshop 'New Agents in International Law' at Stanford University. Here I especially want to thank James A. Gardner, Makau Mutua, Guyora Binder, John Schlegel and Kenneth Ehrenberg, participants in the book presen ta ti on at the SUNY at Buffalo. Others that I wish to recognise for their help, comments and guidance are Mark Tushnet, Larry Kramer and Bruce Ackerman.
I also benefited greatly from research assistance and facilities provided by the staff of the Stanford Law School Library. I owe thanks to Michael Halliday and Tobby Willet for linguistic corrections and comments, without whose help this book would not exist at all. I want also to express my deep gratitude to John Watson and Edinburgh University Press for its willingness to support this book.
Finally, with this book I want to pay tribute to the Critical Legal Studies and honour the memory of my friend Luay, who died in Benghazi, Libya fighting for democracy.
